Abstract-Linear (k, n) secret sharing scheme is a class of (k, n) secret sharing, where all the n shares of a secret satisfy a linear relationship. It plays an important role in other cryptographic systems, such as multi-party computation and function sharing schemes. On the other hand, cheating problem in (k, n) secret sharing is an important issue, such that cheaters (dishonest players) submit forged shares during secret reconstruction to fool honest players. During decades of research on cheating prevention, vast (k, n) secret sharing schemes against cheating have been proposed. However, most of these schemes are not linear schemes since it contains redundant information in their shares to achieve cheating detection. Since linear (k, n) secret sharing is an important primitive in threshold cryptography, linear (k, n) secret sharing scheme with the capability of cheating detection is also worthwhile to be discussed. In this paper, we propose a linear (k, n) secret sharing scheme against cheating based on Shamir's original scheme, which possesses the following merits: (1) Our scheme is just combination of two Shamir's schemes. Therefore, our scheme can be used in other threshold cryptographic systems which are based on Shamir's scheme. (2) The size of share in proposed scheme almost reaches its theoretic lower bound in (k, n) secret sharing with cheating detection. (3) In the phase of cheating detection, only one honest player can detect the cheating from other k − 1 cheaters, which achieves a stronger detection effective than the previous linear secret sharing schemes against cheating.
I. INTRODUCTION
Secret sharing scheme is a branch of threshold cryptography which deals with secure storage of sensitive secret. In 1979, Shamir [1] introduced the landmark polynomial based (k, n) secret sharing scheme. In his scheme, a trusted dealer divides a secret into n shares, and distributes each share to a player. Any set of k or more players can reconstruct the secret, but any set contains less than k players cannot obtain any information about the secret. Due to the high efficiency of computing shares and reconstructing secret, Shamir's scheme was discussed most in the field of secret sharing. Linear secret sharing [2] is a special type of secret sharing where all shares satisfy a linear relationship. For instance, Shamir's scheme is just a linear secret sharing scheme. As we know, linear secret sharing scheme is an important tool to constructing other complicated cryptographic systems, such as multi-party computation [3] [4] [5] , and function sharing schemes [6] [7] [8] [9] .
The cheating problem in (k, n) secret sharing is first proposed by Tompa and Woll [10] in 1989. They pointed that in the phase of secret reconstructing, dishonest players (cheaters) release forged shares, making the honest players reconstruct a fake secret. On the contrary, the cheaters can reconstruct the valid secret exclusively. It is obvious that Shamir's original (k, n) secret sharing scheme does not have the ability to resist such cheating, even one cheater can successfully fool all the other honest players. To safeguard the equities of honest players, secret sharing scheme with the capability of cheating prevention is indispensable. The simplest method to detect cheating is to publish a hash value w = H(s) of the secret s, then players can detect cheating by checking whether w equals to H(s * ) (where s * is the reconstructed secret). However, the security of this type of schemes is based on the hash function (or other math problems), it is not unconditional secure. During decades of discussion, vast unconditional secure secret sharing scheme with cheating prevention were proposed. The schemes [11] [12] [13] [14] solved the problem of cheating detection. As we know, in secret sharing scheme without cheating detection, the size of share can be same as the size of secret (we use the symbols |V| and |S| to denote the sizes of share and secret respectively). However, in those schemes capable of detecting cheating, the size of share |V| is expanded from the size of secret |S|. Meanwhile the cheating has only a small success probability , in other word, the honest players can detect the cheating behavior with the probability 1− . The other category of cheating prevention is to identify cheaters [15] [16] [17] [18] . In those schemes, the honest players involved in secret reconstruction not only can detect the cheating behavior, but also figure out the identities of all cheaters. However, in secret sharing schemes with cheater identification, the size of share |V| is much larger than those in secret sharing scheme capable of just detect cheating. Hence, we only focus on the problem cheating detection in our work.
As we know, most secret sharing schemes with cheating prevention are not linear schemes. For instance, the secret sharing schemes [10] [11] [13] [14] [19] can detect cheating, and they are all based on Shamir's original linear secret sharing scheme. However they are still not linear schemes since the shares in those schemes contain redundant information to achieving cheating detection. Therefore the shares do not satisfy the linear relationship any more. Since linear (k, n) secret sharing is an important primitive in threshold cryptography, linear (k, n) secret sharing scheme with the capability of cheating prevention is also worthwhile to be discussed. In [20] , Pieprzyk and Zhang proposed a linear secret sharing scheme against cheating. However, the cheating detection works only when there is a single cheater in secret reconstruction. In [21] , Harn and Lin presented a linear secret sharing scheme that is secure against cheating from multiple cheaters. The restriction of Harn-Lin's scheme is that more than k players are required in secret reconstruction for cheating prevention. But later, the literature [22] showed that this scheme can be broken by an easy attack. In [23] , a linear secret sharing scheme with cheating detection for a general access structure was proposed, and it can be applied on (k, n) secret sharing schemes. In this paper, we propose a new linear (k, n) secret sharing scheme against cheating based on Shamir's original scheme, which possesses the following merits: (1) Our schemes are just combination of two Shamir's schemes. Therefore, our schemes can be used in other threshold cryptographic systems which are based on Shamir's scheme. ( 2) The size of share |V| in proposed schemes reaches its theoretic lower bound in (k, n) secret sharing with cheating detection. (3) Only one honest player can detect the cheating from other k − 1 cheaters, which achieves a stronger detection effective than the previous linear secret sharing schemes against cheating. In addition, we give an extension our scheme where the successful cheating probability can be chosen regardless of the size of secret |S|.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section II, we give some preliminaries including the definitions of secret sharing, linear secret sharing, and secret sharing with cheating detection. In section III, we list some previous results of cheating detection in secret sharing scheme. In section IV, we propose our new linear (k, n) secret sharing scheme with cheating detection, and make a comparison between our scheme and the scheme in [23] . In section V, we propose the revised version of proposed scheme. We conclude in section VI.
II. PRELIMINARIES A. (k, n) Secret sharing schemes
The participants of a (k, n) secret sharing scheme consists of a dealer D and n players P 1 , P 2 , ..., P n . The model consists of two steps: Share Generation step and Secret Reconstruction step. In step 1, a dealer D divides a secret s into n shares, v 1 , v 2 , ..., v n , and each share v i , i = 1, 2, ..., n is sent to a player P i secretly. In step 2, any qualified sets which contain at least k players can reconstruct the secret s. A (k, n) secret sharing scheme is a perfect scheme if it satisfies: (1) any k or more players can reconstruct the secret correctly. (2) any k − 1 or less players cannot get any information on the secret.
Here we briefly introduce Shamir's original (k, n) secret sharing scheme. Let p is a prime number, and the secret s is in Z p . The Share Generation step and Secret Reconstruction step of Shamir's scheme are described as follows.
.., n, and then distributes each share v i to the player P i privately. Secret Reconstruction step: Input a list of shares
Obviously, Shamir's scheme is a perfect (k, n) secret sharing scheme. Here, we introduce the meaning of "the size of share (secret)" (denoted as |V| or |S|). Let A be a set that consists of all possible shares (secrets), then the size of A is the size of the share (secret). For example, in Shamir's scheme, the sizes of share and secret are |V| = |S| = p. The information rate ρ of a secret sharing scheme is the ratio between the length of the secret and the length of the share, ρ = log |S| log |V| . When designing secret sharing scheme, the information rate is an important parameter to be taken account. A secret sharing scheme is said to be ideal if its information rate equals to 1, which is the maximum possible value of this parameter.
B. Linear secret sharing scheme
Linear (k, n) secret sharing scheme is a special type of secret sharing scheme where all the n shares of a secret satisfy a linear relationship. The definition of linear secret sharing scheme is given below. [20] A (k, n) secret sharing scheme is a linear secret sharing scheme where the n shares, v 1 , v 2 , ..., v n can be presented as follows.
Definition 1
H is a public k × n matrix whose any k × k sub matrix is nonsingular. The vector (r 1 , r 2 , ..., r k ) is randomly chosen by the dealer.
According to the above definition, we can see that Shamir's (k, n) secret sharing scheme is a linear scheme. Let
denotes the entry at i−th row and j−th column of matrix H).
As we know, linear schemes can achieve higher information rate in all kinds of secret sharing schemes [23] . This is one of the reasons that we are interested in designing linear secret sharing schemes with cheating detection.
C. Secret sharing scheme with cheating detection
It is easy to understand that secret sharing scheme with cheating detection is a category of secret sharing scheme where the honest players have the ability to detect cheating behavior in secret reconstruction. The model also consists of two steps: Share Generation step and Secret Reconstruction step. The Share Generation step is just same as in the ordinary secret sharing scheme.
However, Secret Reconstruction step is different from the ordinary one, it takes a list of k shares as input, and outputs a secret s or a symbol ⊥. Secret Reconstruction step outputs ⊥ only when the cheating is detected. Otherwise if the secret is verified to be valid, Secret Reconstruction step outputs a secret s, all players accept this secret. The cheating is successful only a fake secret is verified to be valid. The successful cheating possibility is an important characteristic in a secret sharing scheme with cheating detection. Here we give the description of the successful cheating possibility . With out loss of generality, we suppose P 1 , P 2 , ..., P k participate in secret reconstruction, P 1 , P 2 , ..., P t are t cheaters who aim to fool honest players [10] . In their scheme, a single honest player can detect cheating. Carpentieri, De Santis and Vaccaro [12] first consider a cheating model in which k − 1 cheaters who know the secret try to cheat another honest player. We call it "CDV assumption". A lower bound of size of shares under CDV assumption was given as follows. Proposition 1. [12] In CDV assumption, the size of shares satisfies |V| ≥ |S| , where is the successful cheating probability.
The scheme proposed in [10] can be proved secure against cheating in CDV assumption, where the size of shares is
In [14] , Ogata, Kurosawa and Stinson proposed a new model that k − 1 cheaters do not know the secret try to cheat another player, which is denoted as "OKS assumption". A lower bound of size of shares in OKS assumption was also presented in [14] . Proposition 2. [14] In OKS assumption, the size of shares satisfies |V| ≥ |S|−1 + 1.
In [14] , they also proposed a optimum scheme secure against cheating where the size of share meets the equality of the lower bound in Proposition 2. However, in [13] , Obana and Araki pointed out a drawback of the scheme [14] , such that the scheme in [14] is secure only if the secret is uniformly distributed, when there exists a secret which occurs with high probability, the successful cheating cheating probability would be larger than what is expected.
Those schemes [11] [12] [13] [14] capable of detecting cheating are not linear secret sharing schemes, they use some detection tools like hash functions to detect cheating. In [19] , Pieprzyk and Zhang constructed a linear secret sharing scheme against cheating. In their scheme, the size of share |V i | is optimum, |V| = |S|, and the shares can be split into sub-shares to detect cheating. However, the cheating detection works only when there is one cheater in secret reconstruction. In [21] , Harn and Lin extended Shamir's (k, n) secret sharing scheme into a cheating detection scheme when there are more than k shareholders in secret reconstruction. Since Shamir's scheme is a linear scheme, Harn-Lin's scheme is also a linear scheme which is secure against cheating from multiple cheaters. But later, the literature [22] showed that this scheme can be broken by an easy attack.
IV. PROPOSED SCHEME In this section, we propose a new linear (k, n) secret sharing scheme with cheating detection under OKS assumption. Since in OKS assumption, k − 1 cheaters do not know the information on the secret, which is coincidence with the definition of (k, n) secret sharing, and the size of share under OKS assumption would be smaller than the size of share under CDV assumption. In addition, the cheaters already know the information on secret, somehow they do not have to cheat in secret reconstruction. Instead, they can choose not participating in secret reconstruction at all. Therefore, cheating occurs more likely under OKS assumption than CDV assumption, accordingly, cheating detection under OKS assumption is more practical.
Our proposed linear (k, n) secret sharing scheme with cheating detection is based on Shamir's scheme, and the cheating can be detected when there is only a single honest players. The Share Generation step and Secret Reconstruction step of our scheme is described as follows, where p is a prime number. Notice in Secret Reconstruction step, without loss of generality, we suppose the k involved players are just
where
, and then distributes each share v i to the player P i privately. (m i , d i ) , where m i and d i are both shares of Shamir's (k, n) secret sharing scheme. As we illustrated previously, Shamir's scheme is a linear secret sharing scheme, our proposed scheme is also a linear (k, n) secret sharing scheme. The properties of our proposed scheme are analyzed in following theorems. In theorem 1, we prove that our scheme is a perfect (k, n) secret sharing scheme and in theorem 2, we discuss the property of cheating detection of our scheme. Theorem 1. Our proposed scheme is a perfect (k, n) secret sharing scheme. Proof. As we know, a secret sharing scheme is a perfect (k, n) threshold scheme when k or more shares can reconstruct the secret, and k − 1 or less shares cannot get any information on the secret. In our scheme, the secret s is divided into n shares using Shamir's original (k, n) secret sharing scheme, it is obvious that k or more shares in our scheme can reconstruct the secret.
Secret Reconstruction step:Input a list of shares
Next, we demonstrate that k − 1 or less shares cannot get any information on the secret. In our scheme, each player respectively, and r is a random number in Z p , which is unknown to players. First we prove that any k − 1 players are unable to figure out f (x), g(x) to get the secret. We suppose the k − 1 players are P 1 , P 2 , ..., P k−1 , they have can establish 2k − 2 functions on the 2k unknowns a 0 , a 1 , ..., a k−1 and b 0 , b 1 +1 unknowns a 0 , b 0 , a 1 , b 1 , ..., a k−1 , b k−1 and r, the unknowns cannot be resolved. The k − 1 players cannot get the secret by this way.
Second, we prove that the secret cannot be resolved by the method of exhaustion. For the method of exhaustion, the k −1 players can try all the possible secrets in Z p , and deduce the corresponding k − 1-degree polynomial f (x) = a 0 + a 1 x + · · ·+a k−1 x k−1 . According to our scheme, if there exist a k−1-
k−1 and a common number r, satisfy that:
0) might be the valid secret. However, when a 0 , a 1 are regarded as constants,
therefore these unknowns can be resolved. In other words, using the method of exhaustion, k − 1 players will find every number in Z p might be the valid secret, and each of them has a possibility of 1 p . It means that k − 1 players cannot get any information on the secret by the method of exhaustion. In sum, our proposed scheme is a perfect (k, n) secret sharing scheme. End of proof.
Here, we introduce a lemma first which is helpful for understanding the property of cheating detection. Lemma
Therefore, these unknowns can be resolved, these k − 1 players can deduce a possible secret s = a 0 . In other words, according to the available information from k − 1 players, every number in Z p might be the secret number r selected by dealer, each of them has a possibility 
.., P k participate in secret reconstruction phase, and P 1 , P 2 , ..., P k−1 are k − 1 cheaters who wish to fool P k . Assume the fake shares submitted by cheaters are v *
Since f * (x) and g * (x) can be decided by cheaters exclusively, they can select a random number r * , and satisfies that r
According to our algorithm, if there exist a common number r , satisfying r (a 0 + a *
, the cheating cannot be detected. We can easily observe that the cheating succeeds only when r * = r. As proved in lemma, these k − 1 cheaters have no information on r, the possibility of r * = r is From the above analysis, we can conclude that, comparing to previous linear secret sharing scheme with cheating detection, our scheme has two primary advantages: (1) our scheme can detect cheating from up to k − 1 cheaters. (2) the size of share almost reaches its theoretical upper bound, the size of share |V| = |S| in our scheme is only one bit longer than the existing upper bound under OKS assumption. (see proposition 2) In [23] , the authors proposed another linear secret sharing scheme with cheating detecting for a general access structure. When applied their approach in Shamir's secret sharing scheme, the process of cheating detection is quite similar to our scheme, and can be briefly described as follows. The dealer choose a secret s, and distribute the shares m i , i = 1, 2, ..., n of s to each player P i privately. In addition, the dealer compute e = s 2 , and then generate n shares d i , i = 1, 2, ..., n for e. Finally, the share of each player P i is v i = (m i , d i ). In secret reconstruction, the players reconstruct two values s * , e * using their shares, if e * = (s * ) 2 , s * is the valid secret, else there exist cheaters in secret reconstruction. We can see that their scheme also consists two Shamir's secret sharing schemes, and can also detect cheating from up to k − 1 cheaters. However, comparing to their scheme, our proposed scheme has two advantages. One is that our scheme has higher information rate that their scheme. In our scheme, log p 2 = 1 − log 2 2 log p . We can see that the information rate of proposed scheme is higher that their scheme. The other advantage is that our scheme can save time in cheating detection. As described previously, their scheme requires one multiplication operation ((s * ) 2 ) to detect cheating. In contrary, our scheme only contains addition operation in cheating detection, which is more efficient than their scheme.
V. REVISED VERSION
According to the analysis above, we conclude that our scheme can detect cheating of up to k − 1 cheaters, and the successful cheating possibility is = 1 p . We can see that the successful cheating possibility is relevant to the size of secret, when the prime number p is not large enough, the successful cheating possibility is not acceptable. Here, we give a revised version of our proposed scheme, where the successful cheating possibility can be randomly chosen and other parameters keep their characters in our original scheme.
Revised version Share Generation step: Input a secret s ∈ {0, 1, 2, ..., p−1}. Using the similar analysis in lemma 1, any k − 1 cheaters cannot get any information on the number r. On the other hand, according to similar discussion in theorem 2, the successful cheating possibility of k − 1 cheaters equations to guessing the number r ∈ {0, 1, 2, ..., q − 1}. Therefore, the successful cheating possibility is * = 1 q ≤ which is irrelevant to the size of secret. For other parameters, the size of secret is |S| = p, the size of share is |V| = pq ≈ |S| .
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we discuss the significance of detect cheating in linear secret sharing schemes, and construct a new (k, n) linear secret sharing scheme with the capability of cheating detection. Our proposed scheme has the following merits: (1) Our schemes are just combination of two Shamir's schemes. Therefore, our schemes can be used in other threshold cryptographic systems which are based on Shamir's scheme. ( 2) The size of share in proposed schemes almost reaches its theoretic lower bound in (k, n) secret sharing with cheating detection. (3) Only one honest player can detect the cheating from other k − 1 cheaters, which achieves a stronger detection effective than the previous linear secret sharing schemes against cheating. At last, we give a revised version where the successful cheating possibility can be chosen regardless of the size of secret.
